The second approach to the economy taken by Keynes from his What lessons may we draw from this unusual life of perhaps the most influential economist of the twentieth century. One may be that there is a stronger case than most economists will admit for the broadly interdisciplinary education and experience that shaped his world. We may be permitted even to speculate that if more of our own macroeconomists had had a life more like that of John Maynard Keynes we might not be in the mess we are in today.
Keynes knew well how his close Bloomsbury friend Roger Fry had decomposed the demand for the arts into categories of demanders with different behavioral characteristics, to which Fry gave names like "classicists","Philistines," "snobbists," and "the herd." Maynard performed a similar decomposition for the economy as a whole.
The others in the Bloomsbury Group helped to give to Maynard a deep appreciation of the manifold consequences of failure in a market economy. More conventional economists in his time, as in ours, have been inclined to see recession and depression as regretable phenomena that cause "inefficiency": meaning loss of output and resources misapplied. The Bloomsburys, with their deep concern for history and current events, could see that economic failure could lead quickly also to social and political turmoil, with dire consequences.
Humans, they observed, were reluctant to endure very much economic suffering and if a plausible solution were promised them, they turned easily to dictators and totalitarian rule, as they did in Germany and Italy in the 1930s. But the impact of Bloomsbury on Keynes went well beyond his macro economics, It went, for a start, to the deep philosophical question of what is the purpose of human life, and therefore of the economy. At the time when national accounts were being constructed for the first time and being taken as a measure of human progress between the two world wars, the Bloomsburys were groping for a richer measure of human accomplishment; this they called "civilization."
The notion had its origins in the dictum of the Cambridge ethicist G. E. Moore that the ultimate values in human life lay in states of mind resulting from the pursuit of truth, beauty, and love. Moore's message was restated by Roger Fry to be a concern with the imaginative life of human beings, meaning their creative engagement with literature, the arts, and pure science. The utilitarian metric of the consumption of goods and services per capita was rejected by the Bloomsburys as an input measure, missing the essence of human accomplishment. To accept this dictum was an exceptionally long jump for a prominent economist like Keynes, away from his economist brethren and toward his Bloomsbury friends, but he took it with alacrity.
Taking account of this focus on civilization as the standard by which human progress should be judged, Keynes unusual personal life can be understood. He insisted that humans generally should move beyond the Benthamite prescription in which they spent their time pondering consumption alternatives using a pleasurepain calculus. Maynard urged that, instead, they devote any spare time to sustaining the imaginative life, especially through participation in the activities of nongovernmental organizations in ways that made use of their highest skills. Following this principle Keynes himself spent many of his own waking hours promoting the arts through the Camargo Society for the ballet, the Cambridge Arts Theatre, the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden, the Contemporary Art Society, the London Artists Association, and other groups. Perhaps his most lasting imprint on the arts is as the principal designer of the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts and its successor organization the Arts Council of Great Britain; these sought to provide a vehicle for public support of the arts with minimal public control. This model lies at the roots of the National Endowment for the Arts in the United States, the Canada Council, and other arts funding agencies created after World War II.
What lessons may we draw from this unusual life of perhaps the most influential economist of the twentieth century. One may be that there is a stronger case than most economists will admit for the broadly interdisciplinary education and experience that shaped his world. We may be permitted even to speculate that if more of our own macroeconomists had had a life more like that of John Maynard Keynes we might not be in the mess we are in today.
A symbolic act by Keynes when he was raised to the peerage was to select 6 resigned from the Treasury delegation and, in a state of great agitation, wrote his masterful polemic The Economic Consequences of the Peace.
He thundered:
"The policy of reducing Germany to servitude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings, and of depriving a whole nation of happiness should be abhorrent and detestable -abhorrent and detestable, even if it were possible, even if it enriched ourselves, even if it did not sow the decay of the whole civilized life of Europe. Some preach it in the name of justice. In the great events of man's history, in the unwinding of the complex fates of nations, justice is not so simple. And if it were, nations are not authorized, by religion or by natural morals, to visit on the children of their enemies the misdoings of parents or of rulers."
This public blast, together with withering verbal portraits of America's Woodrow Wilson, France's Clemenceau, Italy's Orlando, and Great Britain's Lloyd George gave Keynes a public persona. It also endeared him to his Bloomsbury friends -not only had he had created a work of art, but he had melded economic expertise, a passion for justice and fairness, and a willingness to set his own views apart from popular wisdom.
As Keynes had forecast, The Versailles Treaty led to monetary collapse and massive unemployment across Europe. We in the United States tend to think of the Great Depression as beginning in 1929, but the post war collapse of Europe was at depression levels. Over the 1920s Great Britain for example had only one year with an unemployment rate below ten percent. It was in this period that Keynes, the Cambridge don, policy advisor, and public scold, turned to economic journalism. He began to write most of the economics articles for the "Why is it not enough to offer facilities and encouragement to private enterprise? Whether we like it or not, it is a fact that the rate of capital development in the transport system, the public utilities and the housing of this country largely depends on the policy of the Treasury and the government of the day. It is not a question of choosing between private and public enterprise in these matters. The choice has already been made.
In many directions it is the question of the state putting its hand to the job or of its not being done at all. Roads, reforestation, reclamation and drainage, electrification, slum clearance and town planning, the development of canals, docks and harbors; these are the things which need to absorb large sums of capital today, and in every case the initiative necessarily lies with the public authority. …[But] the object is not to develop state enterprise as such. The object is to develop and equip the country through the instrumentality of such forms of organization as already exists and lie ready to our hands." "At the present moment people are unusually expectant of a more fundamental diagnosis; more particularly ready to receive it; eager to try it out, if it should be even plausible. But apart from this contemporary mood, the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back." [General Theory, p. 383] Keynes himself is now that defunct economist. The Wall Street Journal knows that he is defunct, but fears that -zombielike -he won't stay down. Mankiw too knows that he is defunct, but sees a friendly ghost.
My job is to explain Keynes's economics and its influence. I leave it you to decide whether Keynes is the living dead or Caspar. There is not time, nor would it suit this audience, for me to give a technical account of Keynes's economics. What I can do is to note some of its central ideas.
The Fallacy of Composition
For Keynes people are heterogeneous -each is situated differently, each has different tastes, different capacities, different beliefs. Yet, they form a society. And extending our reasoning from individual interactions to the whole economy is misleading. It commits a fallacy of composition. The quickest way for an individual from New Orleans to Baton Rouge is Interstate 10; but it is not the quickest way to get the whole population of New Orleans to Baton Rouge. Keynes was keenly aware that the complexity of the economy depends on the institution of money, which allows us to obtains goods from people we'll never know, living lives that we can hardly imagine, in places we'll never see.
Robinson and Friday may be selfish, but in an obvious sense they work for each other. If they save, they save by laying up stores. We too work for each other, but only indirectly. Directly, we work for money. And when we save, we save "the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealth owners in the social system of 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probabilities whatever. We simply do not know." [Keynes 1937, pp. 113 114; Collected Works, vol. 14.] For Keynes a conventional response to uncertainty is better than paralysis:
"the necessity for action and for decision compels us as practical men to do our best to overlook [uncertainty] and to behave exactly as we should if we . . ." could calculate the prospects and the risk [Keynes 1937, pp. 113114; Collected Works, vol. 14.] Such a calculation requires a view of those prospects; yet they too are uncertain, and "sanguine temperament and constructive impulses" determine our positive evaluation of them:
"If human nature felt no temptation to take a chance, no satisfaction (profit apart) in constructing a factory, a railway, a mine or a farm, there might not be much investment merely as the result of cold calculation." [General
Theory p. 150]
Elsewhere Keynes refers to "the spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction" as animal spirits and "if the animal spirits are dimmed and the spontaneous optimism falters, leaving us nothing but mathematical expectation, enterprise will fade and die; -though fears of loss may have a basis no more reasonable than hopes of profit had before." [General Theory, pp. 161162] He doesn't put it this way, but there is an expectations multiplier as well as an expenditure multiplier that can turn a boom into a bubble or a slump into a rout.
The Role of Government
When the whirlpool of speculation destroys enterprise, when the financial bubble bursts, when animal spirits dim, and multipliers head south, investment collapses, businesses shut down, and unemployment rises. Then what? An inveterate optimist, Keynes's animal spirits were high. And possessed of a facile pen, an elegant prose style, and access to high places, he urged the government to action.
The General Theory is light on policy prescriptions -it is by no means the bible of deficit finance and big government that critics who know it without reading it suppose. Keynes would rather avoid slumps than fight them, which argued for sound passive policies (especially monetary policies) to prevent emergencies. He would certainly have welcomed the automatic fiscal stabilizers, such an unemployment insurance payments that rise as output falls. He did not call for the heavy regulation of financial markets, but for disincentives to too rapid turnover. Generally, small disincentives would probably be sufficient, but in a whimsical vein he suggested that perhaps "the purchase of an investment Production. People who attended later told him that he was nearly incomprehensible when he was reading the lectures, but whenever he answered questions he was quite clear. Of course nothing impresses an academic audience like someone being incomprehensible, so the end result was that they offered him a job.
In the summer of that year, even before he even began teaching, he published a review of Keynes' new book, A Treatise on Money, a book that Keynes had been working on for years and which was supposed to establish his credentials as a major monetary theorist. This initiated a fierce debate over their respective theories of the business cycle.
I say fierce because it really was unprecedented: one of Keynes' fellow Cambridge economists chastised Keynes in print afterwards, likening his assault on Hayek to "bodyline bowling" this being a reference to the game of cricket, when the bowler aims for the batsman's body rather than for the wicket, a striking metaphor.
The grounds for the debate were really quite simple -both men had in their respective theories of the cycle drawn upon a framework that had been In its own quiet way, Hayek's review was a polite but really quite devastating attack: he basically said that Keynes had not done his homework.
(Gunnar Myrdal, who would share the Nobel prize with Hayek some 40 years later, was even less flattering, noting Keynes' book as an example of the British penchant for unnecessary originality.) If we recall that Keynes was a Cambridge don, the editor of The Economic Journal, and a major public figure in England, while Hayek, who at age 31 was 16 years Keynes' junior, a young upstart from another county, and that this was all taking place as the downturn of 1930 was turning into the Great Depression, we can see that the stakes were pretty high.
Keynes was apoplectic about the review. His biographer noted that Keynes' copy of it was the most marked up document in Keynes' collection of writings by others.
As is usual in the academic world, he expressed his displeasure by writing a response to it that was published a few months later.
What was unusual is that Keynes used the review not simply to defend his own theory but also to attack Hayek's book. And what an attack it was! I will quote the most famous passage which will give you some idea of the general tone:
"The book as it stands seems to me to be one of the most frightful muddles has to do with their analyses of the business cycle. I think that the best starting point is to say that both of them were fully cognizant of the fact that a market system is occasionally plagued by a business cycle. I say this for two reasons: first, it sometimes seems like people today are surprised that a cycle could ever happen. And second, Hayek is sometimes portrayed as someone who thought that markets always work just fine. This is a man whose first book was titled Where Keynes and Hayek differed of course was in their response to the crisis. For Hayek, because a recession was the system moving itself back to equilibrium, he felt that any attempt to further inject credit into the system would just prolong the period of malinvestment, and ultimately set the stage for a bout of inflation later. Hayek's counsel to simply sit back and let the system adjust was as politically popular during the 1930's as it is today -it was a non starter.
Hayek's his fears about inflation did not materialize after the Great Depression ended. On the other hand, they did materialize during the stagflation of the 1970's that marked the end of the activist Keynesian policy in the United
States. Which of these 2 episodes has more relevance for the downturn of aught 8 is anyone's guess. The danger, as both Keynes and Hayek recognized, was that fiscal and monetary stimulus will go on for too long. In many people's minds, the question boils down to this: Will Washington have the requisite knowledge and political will to start reducing the stimulus at just the right time?
This scary question brings us to a second difference between Keynes and
Hayek. It was captured beautifully by Keynes' biographer Sir Roy Harrod, who talked of "the presuppositions of 6 Harvey Road," (that was the Keynes' family address in Cambridge), the idea that "Reform, in the larger as in the smaller sphere, was to be achieved primarily and principally by the discussion of intelligent people. In all vital matters their views would prevail. Public opinion would be wisely guided."
Keynes was supremely confident that he and a small group of Oxbridge trained experts could effectively manage the economy. Indeed, he was constantly making policy pronouncements, and often changing his mind, so much so that he was often criticized or caricatured in the press. After one notorious policy flip flop, there was a cartoon of Keynes as "the boneless man," and there was even a riff on the old joke about economists: "When five economists gather, you get six different opinions, with two of them held by Keynes."
Hayek for his part often spoke about the limits of our knowledge and the hubris of reason: we just do not have enough knowledge to control something as complex as an economy. George Will recently quoted Hayek on this point: "The curious task of economists is to demonstrate to men how little they know about what they imagine they can design."
He was also wary about the effects of government intervention on the ability of ordinary people to make decisions. As he wrote in The Road to Serfdom, "The more the state plans, the more difficult planning becomes for the individual." The government itself can be one of the forces that induces uncertainty, and there is plentiful evidence of that happening in recent months.
Taken by itself, Hayek's message about the limits of our knowledge suggests the importance of proceeding with caution. If one links it up with other arguments about the nature of the political process, for example, those that are associated with the public choice school of James Buchanan, one's confidence that the political process will yield the right policy is further chastened.
Hayek's message, in short, is a much more depressing one than is Keynes'.
These are depressing times, with many people hurting. But tonight is supposed to be a celebration of the start of a new Center, and of Keynes and Bloomsbury.
So I will end with one of my favorite Keynes' quotes, one that is always popular with my students, and one which should make our transition to the reception awaiting us a bit easier. A few weeks before he died Keynes was asked in an interview if there were anything that he would have done differently. His response was: "I would have drunk more champagne!" š›
